U.S Cop Turned Russian Spy HOODWINKED Secret Service

United States Secret Service police car on roadside. — Photo: Shutterstock

A former police officer built a software company that federal agents used to crack open phones, then prosecutors say he secretly let five Russian nationals run it behind his back.

Story Snapshot

Federal prosecutors charged Oxygen Forensics CEO Lee Reiber and Russian national Oleg Davydov with hiding Russian ownership of a forensics software firm sold to U.S. agencies.
The complaint says five Russian nationals controlled the company through a Cyprus holding company while its software was built by developers in Russia.
The Secret Service’s National Computer Forensics Institute signed a five-year contract with the firm in September 2022, and the Defense Department and Homeland Security also bought its products.
Reiber allegedly denied any Russian ownership or development ties in a March 2026 recorded call with undercover agents posing as Homeland Security officials.
An email attributed to Reiber reportedly warned exposure could “destroy this entire opportunity.”

An Ex-Cop’s Software Firm Lands Deep Inside U.S. Law Enforcement

Lee Reiber spent years in law enforcement before building Oxygen Forensics into a go-to tool for digital investigators. The company’s software helps agents pull data off phones during criminal cases. That reputation opened doors across Washington, landing Oxygen a five-year contract with the Secret Service-run National Computer Forensics Institute in September 2022, plus sales to the Defense Department and Department of Homeland Security.

Federal prosecutors now say that success was built on a lie. A criminal complaint unsealed in September 2026 alleges Reiber and Russian national Oleg Davydov concealed that five Russian nationals actually owned and controlled Oxygen Forensics through a Cyprus-based holding company. That’s not a minor paperwork issue. It’s the exact scenario federal contracting rules exist to catch and block.

Software Built in Russia, Sold as American-Made

The complaint alleges something even more troubling than ownership on paper. Prosecutors say the forensic software itself was developed in Russia, by personnel working there under Davydov’s direction. That means a tool trusted to handle sensitive investigative data may have been engineered inside a country the United States considers a top adversary, at the same time American agencies were feeding it into their casework.

Prosecutors say Reiber told the government otherwise, repeatedly. As recently as March 2026, he allegedly denied on a recorded call with undercover agents posing as Homeland Security officials that any Russian citizen had ownership, control, or development involvement, and insisted those denials had been true since he became CEO in 2022. Reiber and an Oxygen vice president also allegedly told the forensics institute in writing that no Russian entity owned the company and no developer was based in Russia.

A Cover Story That Cracked After the Ukraine Invasion

The timeline prosecutors describe tracks closely with Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the wave of U.S. sanctions that followed. Reiber became CEO that March, and the Russian owners were reportedly scrubbed from public filings around the same time. Prosecutors allege that erasing names from paperwork didn’t erase actual control, and that the same Russian owners kept authority over compensation and bank accounts.

Days after one denial, Reiber allegedly posted a company statement on Oxygen’s own website declaring the firm had “no development presence in any restricted jurisdiction”. That statement, cited directly in the Justice Department’s own release, is the strongest documented pushback against the Russian-control allegations. It shows Reiber didn’t just deny the ties privately; he put a denial in writing for the public to see.

Prosecutors also point to an email they say Reiber sent to Davydov and the other Russian owners, warning that exposure could “destroy this entire opportunity”. If that message holds up as described, it suggests Reiber understood exactly what was at stake and chose concealment over disclosure. That’s the kind of detail that turns a paperwork dispute into a fraud case.

Why This Case Tests the Whole Vetting System

Federal contracting rules require companies bidding on sensitive work to disclose foreign ownership and control, often through self-attestation forms that regulators admit are easy to game. Government auditors have flagged for years that contractors “can conceal ownership information when registering” because the system leans on the honor system rather than independent verification. This case looks like exactly the failure those auditors warned about.

🇷🇺 🇪🇺 A company accused by U.S. prosecutors of secretly operating under Russian ownership spent years inside Europe’s digital-forensics ecosystem, including projects involving criminal evidence and software purchased by European police.

POLITICO reports that Oxygen Forensics,… pic.twitter.com/o6q7SYK1Xj

— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) September 28, 2026

An arrest is an allegation, not a conviction, and Reiber and Davydov haven’t been tried. But the facts laid out in the complaint, paired with Reiber’s own past denials now on the record, raise a serious question conservatives have pushed for years: why does Washington still let contractors self-certify their way into sensitive programs with so little independent checking? If a Russian-controlled vendor really did sit inside Secret Service and Pentagon systems, the fix isn’t more paperwork. It’s real verification before the contract, not federal charges after the damage is done.