U.S. Drug War: A Cover for Regime Change?

The same playbook that justified invading Panama in 1989 to arrest Manuel Noriega on drug charges just played out again in Venezuela, proving the War on Drugs has become America’s most convenient excuse for regime change.

Story Overview

Operation Absolute Resolve captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on narco-terrorism charges, mirroring the 1989 Panama invasion
Four decades of anti-drug campaigns across Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela have failed to stop cocaine flows while serving U.S. geopolitical interests
Plan Colombia funneled billions in military aid to fight coca production, yet trafficking routes simply shifted and adapted
The pattern reveals how drug war rhetoric masks strategic objectives like securing the Panama Canal and Caribbean sea lanes

The Noriega Template Strikes Again

Manuel Noriega was a CIA asset who helped Colombian cartels move cocaine through Panama until he became inconvenient. On January 3, 2026, the United States launched Operation Absolute Resolve, capturing Nicolás Maduro on identical charges. The thirty-six-year gap between these operations reveals the drug war’s true function as a geopolitical weapon rather than a public health strategy.

Both operations targeted heads of state who had outlived their usefulness to Washington. Noriega facilitated U.S. Cold War operations before his drug trafficking became a liability. Maduro’s Venezuela posed different challenges, controlling massive oil reserves while hosting Russian and Iranian influence in America’s backyard. Drug charges provided legal cover for what amounted to regime change operations.

Colombia’s Billion-Dollar Failure

Plan Colombia represents the most expensive anti-drug experiment in history, consuming billions in U.S. military aid since 2000. The initiative promised to end coca cultivation and dismantle trafficking networks through aerial fumigation and military force. Instead, coca production adapted, shifting to new regions while criminal organizations evolved and diversified their operations.

The program strengthened U.S.-aligned military forces and provided lucrative contracts for American defense companies. Meanwhile, peasant communities faced forced displacement, and paramilitaries linked to trafficking received indirect support through counter-insurgency operations. The cocaine kept flowing, but the security apparatus grew more militarized and dependent on American assistance.

Venezuela’s Cartel of Convenience

The “Cartel de los Soles” narrative emerged as U.S.-Venezuelan relations deteriorated under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. American officials portrayed Venezuelan military officers as running a narco-state, though Venezuela produces minimal cocaine compared to Colombia. The country’s primary role involves transit routes and protection services for Colombian trafficking organizations.

This framing served multiple purposes beyond drug interdiction. It justified increased U.S. naval presence in the Caribbean, sanctions against Venezuelan officials, and ultimately military intervention. The narco-terrorism charges against Maduro followed the same legal strategy used against Noriega, creating a precedent for extra-territorial enforcement that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels and sovereignty principles.

The Perpetual Fraud Exposed

Forty years of evidence demonstrates that anti-drug operations achieve strategic objectives while failing at their stated mission. The Panama Canal remained under U.S. influence after Noriega’s removal. Colombian military forces became reliable partners through Plan Colombia funding. Caribbean sea lanes stayed accessible to American naval power through expanded interdiction operations.

Drug trafficking organizations consistently adapt faster than enforcement efforts can respond. When pressure intensifies in one corridor, routes shift to neighboring countries or alternative methods. The Medellín and Cali cartels gave way to smaller, more flexible networks that proved harder to target but equally effective at moving product. Mexican organizations eventually dominated logistics, while Colombian production continued despite decades of eradication campaigns.